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NO. 9 JANUARY 2021 Introduction 
China’s Health Diplomacy during Covid-19 
The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in Action 
Moritz Rudolf 
International cooperation in the health sector has been a firm component of China’s 
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) for over five years. Since the outbreak of the Covid-19 
pandemic, the Chinese leadership has been promoting this aspect of the initiative 
(“health silk road”) as essential to building a “global community of common destiny”. 
The pandemic has revealed the strengths of the BRI and the way it functions. China’s 
health diplomacy is farsighted and strategic. Beijing has been linking measures to 
combat the Covid-19 pandemic in aid recipient countries with the prospect of post-
pandemic cooperation within the BRI framework. Above all, Beijing wants to be per-
ceived internationally as a “responsible great power”. 
The West’s often narrow focus on the qualitative defects of Chinese aid fails to 
recognise that, in the absence of traditional aid donors, Beijing has supported many 
third countries effectively and extensively. To counter China’s increasing influence in 
regions that are strategically important for Germany and Europe, greater sensitivity 
is needed to the geopolitical implications of the pandemic, as well as specific Euro-
pean proposals for third countries for the post-pandemic period. In parallel with more 
commitment at the multilateral level (for instance within the World Health Organisa-
tion, WHO), other options include strengthening bilateral initiatives (e.g. via regional 
EU+x formats) and coordination with the new US government under Joe Biden. 
 
On 9 and 12 December 2020 the United 
Arab Emirates (UAE) and Bahrain were the 
first countries to approve a Chinese corona-
virus vaccine. Other countries, especially 
in the Global South, have announced that 
they intend to do likewise soon (by 18 Janu-
ary 2021, Egypt, Indonesia, Turkey and 
Brazil, among others, had approved Chinese 
vaccines). It is realistic to assume that China 
will play an important role in vaccinating 
the world’s population. This would be con-
sistent with the narrative promoted by the 
Chinese leadership: China is a responsible 
great power. Since the outbreak of the pan-
demic, China has linked its contribution 
in combating the virus to President Xi Jin-
ping’s foreign-policy prestige project, the 
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). 
Health as Part of the BRI 
Health has been on the BRI agenda for over 
five years. In March 2015 the framework 
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document Vision and Actions on Jointly 
Building Silk Road Economic Belt And 21st-
Century Maritime Silk Road already listed 
cooperation to prevent and contain epi-
demics among its objectives. According to 
official BRI documents, health cooperation 
also includes: 
∎ training programmes for medical staff; 
∎ capacity-building for public health crises; 
∎ emergency medical relief for crises; 
∎ promoting Traditional Chinese Medicine 
(TCM); 
∎ free treatment abroad by Chinese 
doctors. 
The BRI framework document The Belt 
and Road Initiative – Progress, Contribu-
tions, and Perspectives (April 2019) refers to 
56 bilateral health agreements that China 
has concluded, inter alia with the WHO and 
the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation. The 
BRI Standardisation Action Plans of 2015–
2017 and 2018–2020 also mention Chinese 
efforts to set uniform standards for TCM 
and the definition of medical terms. The 
BRI Development Plan for Promoting TCM 
(2016–2020) makes it clear that Beijing 
plans to promote traditional Chinese medi-
cine internationally. 
In realising the Health Silk Road, as in 
all other areas of the BRI, Beijing acts strategi-
cally, flexibly and at several levels simulta-
neously (bi- and multilateral, regional, and 
global). The so-called China+x mechanisms 
are essential here. These are formats for 
Chinese cooperation, for instance with coun-
tries from the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries, Africa 
(FOCAC), Central and Eastern Europe (17+1), 
or the Arab League. Health cooperation 
within these mechanisms does present 
differences from region to region, but it 
reflects large swathes of the content (at 
times verbatim) of the Chinese BRI docu-
ments. 
Since 2015 there has been a regular 
forum of the Chinese health minister with 
17 (until 2019: 16) Central and East Euro-
pean colleagues (2015 in Prague; 2016 in 
Suzhou; 2017 in Budapest; 2019 in Sofia). 
The declared objectives of the format are 
the promotion of TCM in Europe, pro-
grammes for exchange and cooperation (for 
hospitals, the health industry, and univer-
sities), access to markets (for example for 
medicines), and cooperation in combating 
infectious diseases like MERS and SARS (see 
the Suzhou Declaration of 20 June 2016). 
New structures have been created for this 
format, including the 17+1 Hospital Alliance, 
the 17+1 Cooperation Network for Public 
Health, the 17+1 Cooperation Network for 
Health Workers, the 17+1 Research Net-
work for Health Policy, and the 17+1 Co-
operation Forum for Approval of Medicines. 
Health was already a prominent part of 
China’s relationship with the ASEAN coun-
tries before the BRI was announced. In 2012 
the parties concluded a Memorandum of 
Understanding on health cooperation. On 
26 October 2016, the participants in the first 
China-ASEAN Health Cooperation Forum 
adopted the Nanning Declaration. It focuses 
on exchanging information, jointly prevent-
ing and controlling infectious diseases, train-
ing health sector professional, promoting 
TCM, and deploying Chinese doctors. For 
the “Lancang-Mekong” countries (Cambodia, 
Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam), 
one focus of China’s BRI health diplomacy 
is on free eye operations. 
In September 2015 the China-Arab States 
Health Cooperation Forum was held as part 
of a dialogue forum that China has estab-
lished with Arab League countries. Accord-
ing to the Yinchuan Declaration that it 
adopted, this cooperation includes techno-
logical collaboration, promoting TCM, pre-
venting and controlling infectious diseases, 
medical training programmes, coordinating 
public health system reforms, exchanges 
between medical establishments and staff, 
and coordinating on global health issues. 
Health cooperation is most significant in 
China-Africa relations, where it dates back 
to long before the BRI was announced (for 
example, the deployment of medical per-
sonnel, a decades-old practice). Since 2015 
it has been absorbed into the BRI as part of 
the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation 
(FOCAC). It consists, inter alia, of providing 
medical supplies, training programmes, 
building hospitals, and support for com-
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bating infectious diseases such as malaria 
and Ebola (see e.g. the FOCAC Johannesburg 
Action Plan [2016–2018] and the FOCAC 
Beijing Action Plan [2019–2021]). 
Health was also important within the 
BRI on a bilateral level before the Covid 
pandemic. China has been sending medical 
personnel to offer free treatment in regions 
where China+x formats are less widespread. 
Here China’s commitment in South Asia 
and Oceania must be emphasised (Beijing 
has sent teams of doctors to Nepal, Micro-
nesia, Vanuatu, Tonga and Fiji, for exam-
ple). China is also active in Central Asia. Its 
most important pilot project is the Medical 
Services Centre of the BRI Core Region Xin-
jiang. This hospital cooperation platform 
provides medical help for patients from 
neighbouring countries (such as free heart 
operations for Afghan children). It also aims 
to network Central Asian hospitals with 
Xinjiang (for example for medical tourism). 
Most important at the global level is the 
Memorandum of Understanding on Health 
Sector Cooperation under the Belt and Road 
Initiative signed by China and the WHO 
on 18 January 2017. It uses the term Health 
Silk Road for the first time. The WHO’s ex-
plicit support for the BRI reflects the grow-
ing influence of the People’s Republic with-
in the WHO, which has been noticeable for 
years. In August 2017 officials from many 
countries, international organisations and 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) 
signed the Beijing Communiqué on BRI 
Health Cooperation and the Health Silk 
Road, which summarises the fundamental 
elements of China’s BRI health policy. 
Activating the BRI Networks as 
Part of “Mask Diplomacy” 
Once the coronavirus outbreak in Wuhan 
became known, China initially appealed to 
the international community and received 
material and financial aid from more than 
58 countries (including Australia, Belarus, 
Djibouti, Germany, Pakistan, Bahrain, the 
USA and Surinam). Even smaller contribu-
tions (for instance a €100 donation from 
Comoros) were used for propaganda by Bei-
jing as a sign of solidarity and evidence of 
the Health Silk Road mentality. 
In late February, when the Chinese 
leadership had gradually regained control 
of the outbreak in the country, Beijing 
quickly took on the role of relief supplier. 
Since a majority of the world’s mask fac-
tories are in China and many industrialised 
nations had delivered relief aid to Wuhan, 
the Chinese leadership was in an almost 
monopolistic position to provide the world 
with masks and medical kits. In particular, 
countries that had inadequate medical 
equipment very quickly received donations 
of much-needed aid supplies (masks, test 
kits, and respirators). Beijing also sent teams 
of doctors to 43 countries. Nearly all the 
world’s countries have received support 
from China (see Map 1, p. 7). 
Aid supplies came from a variety of 
actors, not only from China’s central gov-
ernment and the Communist Party, and 
often took into account China’s strategic 
interests in the recipient nation. Provinces 
and cities supplied their partner municipal-
ities and regions. Majority Muslim countries 
(such as Afghanistan, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, 
Lebanon and Jordan) received masks from 
Xinjiang Autonomous Region. In Southeast 
Asia (e.g. Laos, Cambodia, Myanmar), sol-
diers from the People’s Liberation Army 
delivered medical aid supplies. In countries 
where Chinese state-owned companies run 
BRI projects (for instance in Africa), donors 
included relevant banks, construction com-
panies, and raw material companies. The 
telecoms company Huawei preferentially 
gave support to countries in which it was 
pursuing strategic interests in the 5G ex-
pansion: in Europe these included the 
Czech Republic, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, 
the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Serbia, 
and Spain. Business foundations (especially 
the Jack Ma Foundation and the Alibaba 
Foundation) delivered masks, respirators, 
and testing apparatus to over 150 countries. 
Trade associations, overseas Chinese, and 
NGOs were also involved. As part of “mask 
diplomacy”, many recipient countries saw 
the involvement of locally resident Chinese 
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actors, who normally tend to live apart 
in parallel societies. These forms of help 
for the local population correspond to the 
objective formulated in many BRI docu-
ments of generating broad support for 
China’s Silk Road policy. 
China even offered aid supplies to states 
that do not (yet) have diplomatic relations 
with Beijing, especially in Latin America. 
In Paraguay the parliamentary opposition 
demanded that relations with Taiwan be 
broken off so as to receive aid from Beijing. 
Belize received donations of auxiliary ma-
terials from Chinese organisations that were 
supposedly NGOs. A remarkable PR coup 
for Beijing were the photos of Belize City 
councillors posing in front of Chinese flags. 
China’s propaganda machine has been 
running at full speed for months. The con-
tent for this streamlined Covid-19 narrative 
comes from the white book Fighting Covid-
19: China in Action. Chinese diplomats 
have been publishing articles in local daily 
newspapers in which they describe China’s 
relations with the country to which they 
have been posted according to this narra-
tive. These articles present China as a 
rescuer that is the equal of the aid recipient 
countries, and as a responsible internation-
al great power. China’s help, the narrative 
claims using a key BRI expression, is sym-
bolic of the “global community of common 
destiny” to which it aspires. The articles are 
reminiscent of China’s propaganda strategy 
in the early days of the BRI: similarly, back 
then sizeable newspaper adverts were used 
(though primarily by members of the leader-
ship, not diplomats) to promote the BRI. 
A new development is China’s presence 
on “Western” social media such as Twitter 
or Facebook, which are not available in 
China. Almost every day, China’s diplomatic 
missions disseminate updates on social net-
works about China’s local contributions to 
combating Covid-19. Xi Jinping’s wife, the 
singer and WHO special envoy Peng Liyuan, 
also has a role in China’s health diplomacy, 
for instance by leading online ceremonies 
to mark Chinese assistance. Peng has also 
personally donated protective masks to 
many African countries. 
China’s mask diplomacy has been criti-
cised, particularly in Europe; the necessary 
logistics, activation of Chinese actors, and 
uniform external communications are never-
theless remarkable achievements. For many 
countries China was a reliable partner, espe-
cially since traditional aid donors (above 
all the USA) were absent. For the first time, 
Beijing has given its global BRI rhetoric 
some substance. 
Next Act: Vaccination Diplomacy 
Phase III trials are currently running in 
18 countries, especially in Latin America, 
Southeast Asia, and the Arab world, for the 
vaccines produced by five Chinese compa-
nies (Sinopharm, CanSinoBIO, Sinovac and 
Anhui Zhifei Longcom Bio, IMBCAMS). China 
has already concluded contracts for vaccine 
deliveries with 26 countries; 10 (see Map 2, 
p. 8) have approved Chinese vaccines (as 
of 18 January 2021). Many other countries 
would like to use a Chinese vaccine or are 
currently negotiating contracts. 
On this issue, too, the Chinese leadership 
wants to be perceived as a “responsible great 
power”. Once again it is acting bi- and 
multilaterally. On 18 May 2020 Xi Jinping 
announced in a speech to the WHO in 
Geneva that China would be providing the 
world with an inexpensive vaccine as a 
“global public good”. This is typical BRI 
rhetoric. The Initiative has been promoted 
using the same vocabulary for years. Presi-
dent Xi also promised the WHO US$2 bil-
lion for the fight against corona. In October 
Beijing joined the vaccine platform COVAX, 
an initiative by the United Nations, Euro-
pean Union and France, which aims to en-
sure a fair distribution of vaccines. 
While the first months of the pandemic 
were marked by bilateral aid supplies, Bei-
jing has been increasingly using China+x 
formats for its vaccine diplomacy. These 
formats link vaccine promises with the 
prospect of economic support and long-
term cooperation projects. The starting-
point was the Extraordinary China-Africa 
Summit on Solidarity against Covid-19 
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(June 2020). The Chinese leadership prom-
ised preferential vaccine deliveries, “debt 
cancellation”, and reinforced economic 
relations after the pandemic (such as help 
with investments in the digital economy, 
boosting renewable energies, and expand-
ing the 5-G network). One month later, 
Beijing organised a health summit with the 
Arab League states. Here too China held out 
the prospect of vaccination cooperation as 
well as strengthened bilateral economic 
relations (under the BRI framework). Also 
in July, Beijing promised Latin American 
and Caribbean countries US$1 billion for 
purchasing vaccines. On 24 August Prime 
Minister Li Keqiang explained that the Lan-
cang-Mekong countries would be prioritised 
for vaccine deliveries and that funding 
could come from a Public Health Fund. In 
turn Foreign Minister Wang Yi identified 
the ASEAN as a priority region for vaccines. 
Similar promises (vaccine priority and ex-
pansion of economic relations) were made 
at the China-Pacific Island Forum. In Novem-
ber high-ranking officials from China and 
South Asian countries (Bangladesh, Nepal, 
Pakistan, Sri Lanka) held talks about vac-
cinations. 
What is remarkable is that the most 
advanced format institutionally, the 17+1, 
has played a subordinate role in China’s 
vaccine diplomacy. In 2020 only two 
webinars were held at vice-ministerial level. 
China’s vaccine diplomacy in Europe, on 
the other hand, has been designed bilater-
ally and is aimed primarily at Hungary and 
Serbia. 
China’s commitment to Latin America 
and the Arab world is particularly promi-
nent. These regions have recently also 
gained importance for the BRI. The new 
China-Pacific Islands health cooperation 
forum in turn emphasises China’s strategic 
orientation towards the southern Pacific. 
Assessment 
The BRI has not floundered on Covid-19, as 
some observers had predicted in the early 
days of the pandemic. On the contrary, Bei-
jing has increasingly been linking its con-
tribution to combating the pandemic with 
the BRI narrative (e.g. the advantages of 
global connectivity; the construction of 
a “global community of common destiny”). 
With its high degree of flexibility, strong 
political will, and logistically advantageous 
starting position, the BRI has so far been 
able to weather the test of this crisis. 
Beijing’s health diplomacy has revealed 
the way the initiative functions, and espe-
cially its adaptability. Virtually overnight, 
health was promoted from a marginal to 
a key subject of the BRI. In the briefest of 
times, China activated BRI networks around 
the world. The necessary infrastructure 
was already available from other BRI com-
ponents. BRI rail links and the so-called Air 
Silk Road (with hubs in Luxembourg and 
Liège) were repurposed as supply lines for 
aid goods. Now the interlinking of the Digi-
tal Silk Road with the health BRI is also on 
the agenda (for instance to facilitate con-
tact tracing). Institutionally China can here 
draw on numerous China+x mechanisms 
to drive the BRI forward. 
While, in the early days of the pandemic, 
the USA mostly did not participate in inter-
national aid measures, China filled this gap 
and is now advancing further into the tra-
ditional backyards of the USA’s spheres 
of influence (Latin America and the Arab 
world). 
The widespread view in Germany and 
Europe that China’s mask diplomacy has 
been unsuccessful, fails to recognise that 
China has been targeting success in coun-
tries outside of Europe, where it is increas-
ingly viewed as a responsible great power. 
Beijing has been helping third states effec-
tively and extensively. 
After the pandemic, China might well be 
able to further expand its influence in key 
BRI regions: it has been acting strategically 
and far-sightedly in its (health) initiative. Its 
health diplomacy links measures to combat 
the pandemic with BRI promises (prosperity 
through connectedness with China). To 
counteract further growth of China’s influ-
ence on strategic regions, Europe should 
make proposals to third countries for the 
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post-pandemic period (political cooperation 
and economic support). Europe has a lot of 
catching-up to do in this respect. Its under-
standing of the geopolitical implications of 
Covid-19 is insufficient. 
Chinese competitors have so far not 
emerged as forerunners in the vaccine race. 
Yet there are promising Chinese vaccines. 
Despite growing doubts over their efficacy, 
Beijing will profit from national production 
capacities in the coming months and be in 
a position to provide the Global South with 
vaccines. Beijing plans to vaccinate 50 mil-
lion of its own citizens against the corona-
virus by early February. It would not be 
surprising therefore if Chinese vaccination 
teams were deployed in developing nations 
in the coming months under the BRI 
banner. 
Political decision-makers in Germany and 
Europe need to realise and react to the fact 
that China’s health diplomacy, just like the 
entire BRI, operates on several levels simul-
taneously: bi- and multilateral, regional, 
and global. Multilateral commitments (e.g. 
within the WHO) should be strengthened; 
where appropriate, China should be co-
operated with (for instance under COVAX). 
However, this alone is insufficient. Over 
the past few years, Beijing has massively 
expanded China’s influence at the multi-
lateral level (especially within the WHO). 
To oppose this expansion in third countries, 
Germany and Europe would do well to 
strengthen their own bilateral commit-
ments as well. Regional EU+x formats with 
countries in strategically relevant regions 
(e.g. Indo-Pacific or Africa), or appropriate 
measures coordinated with the new Biden 
administration in the USA, would be poten-
tial courses of action. 
  
Moritz Rudolf is an Associate in the Asia Research Division at SWP. 
 
 
© Stiftung Wissenschaft 
und Politik, 2021 
All rights reserved 
This Comment reflects 
the author’s views. 
The online version of 
this publication contains 
functioning links to other 
SWP texts and other relevant 
sources. 
SWP Comments are subject 
to internal peer review, fact-
checking and copy-editing. 
For further information on 
our quality control pro-






Stiftung Wissenschaft und 
Politik 





Telephone +49 30 880 07-0 





Translation by Tom Genrich 
(Updated English version of 
SWP-Aktuell 5/2021) 
 SWP Comment 9 





SWP Comment 9 
January 2021 
8 
Map 2 
 
